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EQUALITY LAW PLURALISM
Olatunde C.A. Johnson*
This contribution to the Constance Baker Motley Symposium
examines the future of civil rights reform at a time in which
longstanding limitations of the antidiscrimination law framework, as
well as newer pressures such as the rise of economic populism, are
placing stress on the traditional antidiscrimination project. This Essay
explores the openings that nevertheless remain in public law for
confronting persistent forms of exclusion and makes the case for greater
pluralism in equality law frameworks. In particular, this Essay examines innovations that widen the range of regulatory levers for promoting
inclusion, such as competitive grants, tax incentives, contests for labor
agreements and licenses, requirements attached to land-use development, and scoring systems for public contracts that reward entities for
pursuing equity goals. Relying on these types of regulatory incentives
and levers expands the mechanisms typically employed to advance integration and equity and builds on tools available not just at the federal
level but also at the state and local level. Even in the present political
environment, this Essay argues there is utility in advancing new regulatory regimes that move beyond the formalist, liberalist assumptions of
traditional civil rights regimes and that seek to link questions of identity
inclusion to economic inequality and the distribution of public goods.
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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium presents an opportunity to honor the legacy of
Judge Constance Baker Motley. Inevitably, it also provides an occasion to
celebrate the transformative impact of Motley and the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund’s (LDF) antidiscrimination project while confronting its
limitations. The transformative impact is not hard to discern or to
celebrate. LDF sought to dismantle segregation through courts, and
Motley was important to the successful aspects of that project. As a young
lawyer, Motley worked on the key higher education desegregation cases1
that laid the ground for Brown v. Board of Education.2 Before the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, Motley successfully challenged rules barring blacks
from accessing certain public housing projects.3 Prior to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, she litigated early cases challenging whites-only
primary elections and other exclusionary voting practices.4 She thus
helped create the foundations that we now understand as civil rights in
the years before federal legislation prohibiting discrimination would
provide the basis for the civil rights regime. We credit these and other
cases with improving the lives of racial minorities in material ways and,
more fundamentally, changing constitutional and statutory understandings
of equality and citizenship.
The story of the project’s limitations, however, is less linear and
devoid of heroes; its end is unwritten. Since the establishment in the
1960s of constitutional rules barring state-sponsored segregation and of a
statutory civil rights framework that prohibits discrimination in education, public accommodations, housing, voting, and other areas of public
life, the narrative has shifted to the messier work of implementation, or
1. E.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: Legal Battles of the Civil Rights
Movement 468 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Constance Baker Motley, Equal Justice Under Law 66, 259 (1998)
(describing her involvement in cases challenging exclusionary voting practices). For
examples of such cases litigated by Motley, see Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391, 392–93 (4th
Cir. 1949) (challenging exclusionary voting practices in South Carolina); Rice v. Elmore,
165 F.2d 387, 388–89 (4th Cir. 1947) (challenging whites-only primary elections).

2017]

EQUALITY LAW PLURALISM

1975

of removing structural rather than formal limitations. Much of contemporary civil rights scholarship is occupied not only with highlighting the
limitations of this first phase of the desegregation and antidiscrimination
project, now characterized as unfinished business (because courts and
other social institutions abandoned meaningful implementation),5 but
also fundamentally with exposing the limitations of the original faith that
prohibitions on discrimination could transform institutions or lead to
substantive equality.6 There is a risk of overstating the binary between old
forms of discrimination and new, between the litigation project and
strategies that de-center courts, and between formal and structural forms
of discrimination.7 But it is hard to avoid confronting the reality that
shifting political and institutional terrains pose challenges to the
antidiscrimination framework represented by Motley and LDF. Today,
courts are less likely to be at the center of affirmative civil rights strategy,
at least around questions of race and gender inclusion.8 Courts remain
important, but increasingly as forums of defensive contestation rather
than affirmative-rights creation. Today, civil rights groups are often

5. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62
UCLA L. Rev. 364, 406–16 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s narrow view of state
complicity and the judiciary’s remedial power in the Milliken litigation).
6. See Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 94–95 (2002) [hereinafter
Loury, Anatomy of Racial Inequality] (arguing that while discrimination is a recognized
moral problem, the problem of entrenched racial disparity is often neglected); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev.
1, 20–26, 40–47 (2006) (describing a turn in antidiscrimination scholarship toward
addressing structural inequalities and expressing a lack of faith that this structural turn will
find resonance in antidiscrimination law); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 465–78 (2001) [hereinafter
Sturm, Second Generation] (describing how explicit bias now operates alongside, or has
been supplanted by, “subtle, interactive, and structural bias”).
7. See, e.g., Olatunde Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, in A Nation of
Widening Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50, at 211, 222—23 (Ellen D. Katz &
Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 2015) [hereinafter Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination]
(detailing how antidiscrimination law provided a mechanism for leveraging broader,
structural reforms within and outside courts). Pragmatic and problem-solving approaches
often emerge after the establishment of rights in courts. See Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability
6–42 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14420, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507280 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing the trajectory of civil rights ligation against police departments and showing
how litigation prompted divergent reforms in two cities). Regulatory expansions often
emerge after rights establishment through litigation. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92,
570, 574, 576, 903) (strengthening a fair housing rule after successful litigation was brought
to enforce a prior rule).
8. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 151, 153–55 (2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has become less vigorous in protecting the rights of
racial minorities and women under the Equal Protection Clause).
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working to preserve longstanding interpretations9 or thwart new efforts
to undermine rights.10
In many respects, Motley anticipated this shift away from affirmativerights elaboration in courts. Leaving LDF in 1963, before the passage of
the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, her belief was that most of the
major legal constitutional battles had ended, and that what remained was
the implementation of Brown.11 Tellingly, before Motley’s appointment
to federal court, her “civil rights” work shifted to state and city government
policymaking, realized in her efforts to promote community revitalization
and enhance availability of affordable housing in New York.12
Motley’s move to state and city government resonates with an account
of why the antidiscrimination project in some respects has stalled. First is
the limitation of discrimination (at least in its judicial formulations) as an
explanation for persistent inequality—its dependence on the notion that
removing formal barriers could alter the underlying institutional frameworks, or remedy centuries of disinvestment in communities. We can call
this the formalist assumption underlying antidiscrimination law. The
second and related assumption is the antidiscrimination framework’s dependence on courts for norm implementation. By some accounts, courts
were reluctant to advance effective remedies (such as in the area of
housing and school integration), and one can debate whether this is a
limitation of the judiciary’s institutional competence, or reflects a failure
of imagination by litigators. This reliance on courts is often embedded
in a much broader critique of legal liberalism: the emphasis on “rights
establishment” by organizations like LDF and the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU).13 No doubt, one might welcome legal liberalism’s court9. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2507 (2015) (preserving the disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act,
consistent with four decades of lower court jurisprudence).
10. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 206–07 (4th Cir.
2016) (challenging a North Carolina law imposing voter identification requirements and
repealing ballot-access measures); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2016)
(en banc) (challenging a Texas voter identification law). It is important not to overstate
the distinction between the current defensive posture and the quest to establish
affirmative rights. It may be that affirmative rights emerge from defensive cases. The cases
defending voting rights might, for instance, provide a mechanism for establishing a more
robust conception of the right to vote. In addition, the effect of some of these voting rights
cases has been to revive notions of equal protection claims against state legislatures. See
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 207 (finding proof of discriminatory intent).
11. See Motley, supra note 4, at 205.
12. See id.
13. See William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127, 130 (2004) (defining “Legal
Liberalism” as “the positions and ideas conventionally associated with the Warren Court,
the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Ralph Nader, and the legal aid and public
defender movements”); id. at 136 (describing legal liberalism as a “commitment to
formulating certain fundamental norms as rights, and to insisting on the priority of these
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centered,
lawyer-directed
approach
for
battling
incipient
authoritarianism or securing basic democratic rights,14 but it seems less
suited to the multidimensional work of implementing social and economic
inclusion.
The limitations of the antidiscrimination project have been bare for
several decades, and additional challenges loom today. Economic populism (from both the right and left) often seeks to sublimate or exploit
questions of race, ethnic, and gender difference.15 Battles for political
and social inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups are now subject
to critiques of “identity liberalism.”16 At the same time, social movements
such as Black Lives Matter are increasingly disavowing forms of organizing and advocacy associated with old and “neo” liberalism.17 Groups
such as “Fight for 15,” while built on antiracism, are focused on
economic inclusion through grassroots mobilization, not rights attainment in courts.18 In other words, the winds may not be behind the sails of
traditional rights-centered antidiscrimination reform.
Legal scholarship’s answer to the antidiscrimination framework’s
limitation is often to advocate some form of exit. Scholars such as
Professor Richard Ford have at times suggested abandoning the antidiscrimination framework and instead relying on social welfare internorms over other values” and as dependent on a vision of rights as “analytical,
individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and corrective”).
14. See Press Release, NAACP LDF, Joint Statement of Seven Civil Rights Leaders:
Vow to Oppose Threats to Racial Justice Under Trump (Nov. 14, 2016), http://
www.naacpldf.org/press-release/discriminatory-voting-laws-voter-intimidation-appear-havetaken-toll [http://perma.cc/Y3LR-9FPZ] (vowing to fight voter suppression, hate crimes,
and other attacks on minority rights after the November 2016 election).
15. See Benjamin L. McKean, Is It Possible to Have Populism Without Racism?, Wash.
Post (May 18, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/
05/18/is-it-po (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how populist movements
often rely on racial resentment and xenophobia); Jedediah Purdy, Tomorrow’s Fight,
Dissent: Blog (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/donald-trumpvictory-tomorrow-fight-socialism [http://perma.cc/NQZ6-QZXH] (noting that “[s]ome
good-faith critics on the left found [Bernie] Sanders’s treatment of gender and race less
persuasive than his class politics” but concluding that “those generational and regional
differences should not limit the movement that grew up around him”).
16. See, e.g., Mark Lilla, Opinion, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. Times (Nov.
18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identityliberalism.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
17. See Frederick C. Harris, The Next Civil Rights Movement, Dissent Mag., Summer
2015, at 34, 35–40 (attributing the novelty of the Black Lives Matter movement not only to
its reliance on social media and avoidance of the charismatic-leadership model, but also to
the advancement of bottom-up participatory models of democracy and eschewal of civil
rights language in favor of a broader “humanity” framework).
18. See Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers into the Middle-Class,
Atlantic (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/fifteendollars-minimum-wage/401540/ [http://perma.cc/M425-AR6Q] (describing the campaigns
of the Fight for 15 movement that focused on direct mobilization to spur wage increases in
particular labor-market sectors and legislative changes at the state and municipal levels).
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ventions to reach shared societal goals.19 My colleague Professor Susan
Sturm has noted the limits of court-ordered remedies and emphasized
the potential of institutional-level interventions operating outside of
formal government regulation or lawsuits.20 As I discuss below, these
alternatives are appealing but have their own constraints. Generalized
social welfare approaches—like today’s economic populism—often
struggle to recognize distributional and resource differences affecting
particular groups. They fail to recognize, for example, the effect of racial
segregation in schools and housing on economic and social mobility. An
emphasis on reforms at the institutional level also risks sidelining public
law tools that can spur inclusion through coercion and incentives.
In this Symposium contribution, I explore the openings in public
law for confronting persistent forms of exclusion at a moment in which
antidiscrimination frameworks are under challenge.21 My interest in
particular is in expanding the regulatory mechanisms that governments
utilize to spur and require inclusion. My broad suggestion in this Essay is
for the development, within the equality framework, of a greater range of
regulatory tools to promote inclusion. The Essay specifically explores the
use of regulatory levers including competitive grants, tax incentives,
contests for labor agreements and licenses, requirements attached to
land-use development, and scoring systems for public contracts that
reward entities for promoting inclusion. Relying on these types of
regulatory incentives and levers expands the tools typically employed to
advance integration and equity. It also has the advantage of building not
just on tools available at the federal level, but on power that lies in the
domain of state and local governments—a turn that is critical in this
political moment. These regulatory regimes have the potential of moving
beyond the formalist, liberalist assumptions of traditional civil rights
regimes by linking questions of “identity” inclusion to economic
inequality and the distribution of social and public goods. Finally, these
new regulatory regimes might prove more responsive to contemporary
social movements that increasingly frame their claims not around
antidiscrimination, but through the lens of economic inclusion. The goal
is not to offer the adoption of these regimes as a single way, but to
explore new sites of innovation that are spurred by the sense of vision
and possibility akin to the one that propelled Motley and LDF’s litigation
in the 1950s and ’60s.

19. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law Corrupts
the Struggle for Equality (2011) (analyzing the limitations of civil rights laws).
20. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 6, at 489–92 (2001) (describing this
new institutional-level approach in efforts by employers to remedy gender disparities and
discrimination).
21. I define public law as the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law that
emerges from courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.
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Part I of this Essay explores some of the prevalent critiques of the
antidiscrimination lawyering model. It argues that these critiques call
into question equality law’s heavy dependence on a prohibitory antidiscrimination approach. Part II offers an argument for using a broader
range of regulatory levers to induce inclusion. It considers the advantages and limitations of this approach as a conceptual framework. Part III
explores this broader model in the specific context of community benefits agreements and first-source hiring programs that leverage government power over contracting, tax, and zoning to promote inclusion in
housing, employment, and environmental well-being.
I. LEGACY AND LIMITS
Two debates have been central to defining the future of civil rights
in the aftermath of LDF’s victories in the 1960s. One is on the future of
legal liberalism—the role of litigation, lawyer-driven change, and courts
in addressing exclusion and inequality—and of its attendant conception
of rights as the path to inclusion. The second debate concerns the
continued salience of antidiscrimination law as an explanation for
persisting inequality or exclusion, and as a strategic and normative
framework for advancing inclusion. Critiques of legal liberalism and
antidiscrimination law have been present ever since the inception of the
civil rights revolution—by which I mean the post-Brown equality framework and the statutory antidiscrimination laws of the 1960s.22 Questioning the adequacy of the framework has perhaps become more salient
as economic inequality, rather than racial inequality, has come to
dominate public discourse on inequality. More pointed is the emergence
of a new economic populism that implicitly and explicitly questions
whether “discrimination,” and particularly “race,” defines the real
problem of inequality and whether racial or identity-based discourse
thwarts the coalition building and organizing necessary to advance
economic inclusion.23
This Part begins by exploring the doctrinal limits of the current civil
rights regime and then examines the more fundamental limits of the
antidiscrimination paradigm during a time of deep concern about economic exclusion. This Part ends by inviting new public law frameworks to
supplement the traditional approach.
A.

The Limits of Legal Liberalism and a Prohibitory Enforcement Regime

The legal liberalism critique prevalent since the 1980s and 1990s
questions the lawyer-driven model of social change, characterized most
22. See Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, supra note 7, at 213 (detailing the
framework of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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prominently by the LDF model, for being too determined by elite lawyers
and insufficiently connected to social movements. Another related
critique is that the LDF model depends too much on courts for implementing remedies or is insufficiently attentive to how to design remedies
that might produce actual change in policy domains.24 Related to this
critique is a questioning of the specific approach taken by LDF as too
driven by the integrationist and insufficiently redistributive priorities of
the elite.25 Commentators have charted the paths not taken by LDF,
which presumably would have been more transformative by addressing
economic inequality as well as integration.26
Even when one accepts that the failure lay not in lawyerly imagination, one might argue that courts failed. Cases like San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez 27 and Milliken v. Bradley 28 sought to
take the antidiscrimination approach further, challenging in constitutional terms the ways in which government decisions, boundaries, and
resource allocations cemented both racial and economic inequality, but
each failed in court.29
Beyond constitutional law, courts thwart statutory antidiscrimination
enforcement. The dominant approach in antidiscrimination law is to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of an identity—i.e., disability, race,
color, ethnicity, gender—and to provide remedies in court or administrative agencies for violations of that behavior. At the federal level, this
is the primary structure of civil rights statutes, and it is the structure
followed at the state and local levels at which statutes often prohibit a

24. See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and
Social Change 6–9 (2d ed. 2004) (“The legal perspective encourages concentration on the
implementation of judicial decrees alone. The courts are, however, only modestly
endowed with coercive capabilities—adequate, perhaps, for dealing with recalcitrant
individuals but probably insufficient for bringing large groups or powerful institutions into
line.”).
25. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 516 (1976) (questioning
whether the integration focus of civil rights lawyers properly served the interests of clients
or the goal of educational equity).
26. See generally Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 10–13 (2007)
(uncovering the work of lawyers in the pre-Brown era to address the economic exploitation
of black workers in the South and arguing that the subsequent focus on Brown later
contributed to the marginalization of claims for economic justice).
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to inequalities in the
system of financing public education in Texas).
28. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (finding that courts lack the power to issue an interdistrict
desegregation remedy that sought to address school segregation between majority-black
Detroit and the surrounding majority-white suburbs).
29. For an account of the Milliken case, see generally Orfield, supra note 5, at 390–
416.
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wider range of activity.30 This form of regulation can be consistent with
spurring innovation in civil rights and social-inclusion law. Government
actors can expand the categories of activities or identities protected in
ways that address new and emerging social problems. For instance, many
states and localities—though not the federal government—prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.31
In recent years, statutes that protect the economically vulnerable have
been the particular focus of state and local innovation. In this regard,
several states and localities have adopted statutes prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of unemployment status, credit history, source
of income, and arrest or conviction status.32 These innovations are
important, but as shown below, the structure of the prohibitory approach
in antidiscrimination law has attendant limits. These limits arise from the
judicial doctrine and the way in which the enforcement and litigation
regime shapes the types of cases pursued.
1. Doctrinal Limits. — This prohibitory antidiscrimination approach
creates important incentives for compliance. For instance, civil rights
statutes frequently provide not just injunctive relief, but also attorney’s
fees, compensatory damages, and even punitive damages.33 Institutions
that want to avoid lawsuits, administrative enforcement action, and
paying attorney’s fees and damages will likely conform their behavior
30. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffusion in Civil
Rights Law, 79 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 3, 2016, at 115, 119–22 [hereinafter Johnson,
Local Turn] (describing subnational statutes addressing discrimination based on source of
income, credit history, arrest record, and other areas).
31. Twenty-three states have some form of protection against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing, or public accommodations. See Past
LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills Across the Country, ACLU, http://
www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map [http://perma.cc/
UD37-6UYE] (last visited July 31, 2017). The majority of these states have protections
against discrimination based on gender identity. Non-Discrimination Laws, Movement
Advancement Project, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws
[http://perma.cc/DY7M-3SA6] (last updated Sept. 26, 2017).
32. See Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Ban the Box: Major U.S. Cities and Counties Adopt
Fair Hiring Policies to Remove Unfair Barriers to Employment of People with Criminal
Records 1 (2013), http://nelp.3cdn.net/495bf1d813cadb030d_qxm6b9zbt.pdf [http://
perma.cc/L8RY-VT4H] (listing fifty cities and counties that have “banned the box,” the
practice of removing arrest or conviction history questions from job applications); Molly
M. Scott et al., Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Expanding Choice: Practical
Strategies for Building a Successful Housing Mobility Program 5–69 (2017), http://
www.prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5NN-CLSM] (compiling state
statutes and local ordinances forbidding discrimination in the housing market on the basis
of source of income); Amy Traub, Ending Unjust Employment Credit Checks, Demos
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/ending-unjust-employment-creditchecks [http://perma.cc/4U3H-6SHE] (reporting that seven states—Washington,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, California, Maryland, and Oregon—have passed laws
prohibiting credit checks in employment).
33. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2), 2000e-5
(2012).
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accordingly. There is some evidence of this dynamic at play in the area of
Title VII litigation. Researchers have shown that Title VII litigation can
spur change not just by those subject to the litigation, but that it can have
broader effects on increasing the hiring of women and minorities.34
Studies have similarly shown that regions with strong fair-housing
enforcement have decreased incidences of discrimination in housing
rental and sales (though particularly in rental markets).35
The success of this type of regime primarily depends on the strength
of private and administrative enforcement, and one key problem derives
from recent constraints in litigation enforcement. This account is most
clearly manifest in the area of Title VII. The volume of Title VII litigation
has risen steadily over the past five decades since the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, with the biggest spike occurring after passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which created a damages remedy and a right to
jury trial.36 There is evidence that these incentives work: The 1991 Act
spurred more litigation and—while it is hard to nail down all the causal
mechanisms—there is evidence that it led to increased hiring of
particular groups of women and minorities.37 Yet there is also evidence of
a countertrend in that the volume of cases does not necessarily lead to
better implementation of the statutory goals. In recent years, studies have
found that plaintiffs are not typically victorious, and decisions favorable
to plaintiffs are eight times more likely to be reversed on appeal than
decisions favoring employers.38 By some accounts, the amount of Title VII
litigation may make judges more hostile to those claims.39 Commentators
have noted that federal judges find Title VII claims to be unmeritorious,
“brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too
few breaks along the way.”40
Besides potential judicial hostility rooted in the volume of Title VII
litigation, the doctrinal landscape makes it hard for plaintiffs to win.
34. See Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in
the U.S. 201–02 (2010) (collecting research on the positive effects of Title VII litigation).
35. See Stephen L. Ross & George C. Galster, Fair Housing Enforcement and
Changes in Discrimination Between 1989 and 2000: An Exploratory Study, in Fragile
Rights Within Cities: Government, Housing and Fairness 177, 177–78 (John Goering ed.,
2007).
36. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073
(1991) (providing compensatory and punitive damages for cases of intentional discrimination and allowing demand for jury trial in such cases); Farhang, supra note 34, at 198–
99 (showing increased litigation after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
37. See Farhang, supra note 34, at 200–01.
38. See Deborah L. Rhode, Litigating Discrimination: Lessons from the Front Lines,
20 J.L. & Pol’y 325, 326 (2012).
39. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 782,
823–40 (2011) (finding that damages, fee-shifting, and other incentives to sue may have
the counterproductive effect of generating judicial backlash).
40. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61
La. L. Rev. 555, 556 (2001).
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Legal scholars have well documented these limitations. The doctrine
emphasizes conscious, explicit discrimination—the idea of the individual
bad actor—when discrimination in fact is often implicit, hidden in organizational practices, subtle, and complex,41 the result of institutional
indifference or negligence, or the result of subjective practices.42 The
requirement that a plaintiff identify a comparator to succeed in discrimination claims poses barriers—because comparators do not always exist—
and thus renders only a narrow set of potentially discriminatory
workplace practices actionable.43 Even disparate impact claims often
depend on the identification of a specific objective policy and practice,
but these practices are often not formalized and are instead embedded
in workplaces.44
This account is not to suggest that litigation enforcement of Title VII
is irremediably broken. Title VII lawyers continue to bring important
cases and win.45 Observers often claim that even plaintiff losses in highprofile cases have power to spur changes in institutional behavior—
witness the recent conversations in Silicon Valley surrounding the potential
41. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 69, 85
(2011) (“[C]ourts largely seem to view discrimination as being motivated by an individual
who possesses a bad motive.”); Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 6, at 468–69
(describing organizational practices that are difficult to trace “directly to intentional
discrete actions of particular actors” such as harassment claims between coworkers and
exclusion caused by patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, and mentoring);
Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 Yale J.L. & Feminism 119,
124–25 (2012) (discussing how the sharp division between disparate impact and disparate
treatment prevents plaintiffs from addressing “structural” workplace practices that fit
neither the fault-based disparate treatment model nor the strict-liability-based disparate
impact model); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1357, 1366 (2009)
(referring to the disparate treatment–disparate impact framework of Title VII as a
“theoretical straitjacket with two arms”).
42. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
Ala. L. Rev. 741, 745 (2005) (“Extensive social psychological literature documents the ways
in which unconscious racism and sexism, and the consequent stereotyping, operate in
employment decisionmaking.”).
43. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 731,
750 (2011) (describing the tendency of judges in antidiscrimination cases to rely on
comparisons between plaintiffs and majority groups in order to find discrimination).
44. See Sperino, supra note 41, at 84–86 (detailing difficulties facing plaintiffs in
disparate impact cases).
45. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 212 (2010) (holding written tests
for admission into the Chicago Fire Department disparately impacted black applicants in
violation of Title VII); United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 99 (2d Cir. 2013)
(finding selection practices of the New York City Fire Department to have an unjustified
disparate impact on Latino and black applicants); Wright v. Stern, 553 F. Supp. 2d 337,
339 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (settling claims of systemic discrimination against the New York City
Department of Parks and Recreation for racially segregated job assignments and
discrimination in pay and promotion); Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation,
Cogdell v. Wet Seal, Inc., No. SACV 12-01138 AG (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 78-1
(settling claims of systemic discrimination in hiring and promotion by a large retailer).
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of a plaintiff’s unsuccessful employment discrimination litigation to
“disrupt” the gender practices of venture capital and tech firms.46 In
addition, litigation enforcement by administrative agencies can circumvent some of the constraints that attend enforcement by private actors. In
the employment area, for instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) can maintain systemic litigation without first
surmounting the procedural hurdles set out in Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.47 The EEOC can also pursue investigations
without an actual complainant by filing a commissioner’s charge.48
Nor is this to suggest that the problem is simply too much litigation.
Particularly in areas outside of Title VII, such as fair housing, one might
diagnose the problem as too little litigation. There is evidence that
private enforcement is scant and penalties are too low to curb discriminatory behavior in housing practices.49 As a result, one might imagine a
set of changes within this prohibitory litigation enforcement regime that
would make it more effective, like increased government enforcement
and more litigation by plaintiffs. Yet, even if one were to pursue improvements within the litigation realm, the limitations of the existing approach
should lead us to explore whether we might gain more from alternative
approaches.
2. Varying Litigation Incentives. — A second set of problems stems
from variation in the incentives for litigation, which inherently limit
efficacy in a complaint-driven enforcement regime. Lawyers will have
incentives to bring cases that they are able to win (or to extract a settlement from) and that yield higher damages. In the employment context
with the difficult doctrinal environment detailed above, there is some

46. See Farhad Manjoo, Ellen Pao Disrupts How Silicon Valley Does Business, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/technology/ellen-paodisrupts-how-silicon-valley-does-business.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Of
course, whether this will produce meaningful change remains to be seen.
47. See Leslie E. Silverman et al., Systemic Task Force Report to the Chair of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2 (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf [http://perma.cc/K99V-BGFW] (noting that the EEOC
was well positioned to tackle systemic discrimination because “unlike private litigants,
EEOC need not meet the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in federal court”).
48. See id. at 1 (“Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] also gave EEOC
Commissioners the authority to issue charges on their own initiative.”).
49. See Ross & Galster, supra note 35, at 179 (arguing that antidiscrimination
enforcement efforts are “unlikely to create an effective deterrent against housing
discrimination so long as the system relies almost exclusively on individual[s] . . .
recognizing that they have been victimized and then filing suit”); Robert G. Schwemm,
Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 375, 379–81 (2015)
(finding that the costs of litigation and low penalties limit the efficacy of private
enforcement).
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evidence that this means avoiding Title VII cases entirely.50 And even in
the domain of Title VII litigation, cases involving firing and promotion
dominate over cases involving hiring.51
In general, front-end discrimination is harder to remedy in a
prohibitory, complaint-driven enforcement regime, particularly when the
plaintiff’s stakes are low. In the area of housing, for instance, high levels
of documented discrimination in rental markets have not produced high
levels of enforcement litigation.52 This is likely because discrimination is
hard for victims to identify (particularly when it involves steering to
particular neighborhoods), and the stakes in rental housing may be
lower for a victim who eventually finds housing elsewhere.53
Here again, one might address these limitations in part by sharpening current enforcement strategies. In housing, greater reliance on
litigation arising from housing testers would mean that actual, injured
plaintiffs would not need to come forward.54 In the area of employment,
the EEOC has in past years indicated that it will “[e]xplore [the] [u]se of
[m]atched-[p]air [t]esting,” but it currently operates no testing program.55
While courts are not settled on the ability of employment testers to
recover damages and injunctive relief,56 the results of audit studies might

50. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 [http://perma.cc/Z97F-FXTJ] (last
visited July 31, 2017). In 1994 there were 1,545 Fair Labor Standards Act cases filed in
federal court; in 2004 there were 3,426; and, in 2014 there were 8,126. Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
FLSA Cases 1990, 1993–99, 2000–14 (2014), http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/215/2014/05/FLSA-Cases-20141.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5KE-ERMA].
51. See Statutes by Issue (Charges Filed with EEOC): FY2010–FY2016, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm [http://perma.cc/
SST2-UYZX] (last visited July 31, 2017); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman,
The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983,
1015–17 (1991) (noting that, while hiring cases dominated EEOC and court dockets in
1966, by 1985 wrongful termination charges significantly outnumbered hiring cases).
52. See Schwemm, supra note 49, at 379–80 (describing a range of barriers to
effective private enforcement).
53. See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to
Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1191, 1202 (2011) (describing disincentives to
litigation by victims of housing discrimination). This is of course why the ability to bring
cases by fair housing testers is such an important component of that regulatory regime.
See Schwemm, supra note 49, at 381–83 (explaining the importance of tester litigation in
the housing context).
54. See Schwemm, supra note 49, at 381–83 (describing uses of testers in fair housing
litigation).
55. See E-RACE Goals and Objectives, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/
e-race/goals.cfm [http://perma.cc/6NZW-GH64] (last visited July 31, 2017).
56. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether Title VII grants
standing for employment testers (Title VII has language different from that in the Fair
Housing Act (FHA)), and lower courts are split on the question. Compare Fair Emp’t
Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(finding that employment testers lacked standing to sue because they did not actually
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still prove useful for conducting investigations and for providing insight
into industry practices.57 These tweaks would be important but likely
inadequate to address the fundamental problem for the category of lowdamages, front-end discrimination cases.
These limits therefore invite us to consider how much of the future
of inclusionary law can depend on lawyers and courts.
B.

Limits of the Antidiscrimination Paradigm in the Era of Economic Populism

The second critique of the civil rights paradigm relates to the more
fundamental limits of the antidiscrimination approach and its capacity to
address group-based subordination and economic inequality. In many
respects, this critique is also longstanding: that the antidiscrimination
framework emphasizes formal inclusion at the expense of substantive
inclusion, thus leaving behind those who lack the economic means and
capital to make use of opportunities.58 More recently, legal and social
science commentators have observed that discrimination is at most a
partial explanation for inequality, and that antidiscrimination law is in
fact increasingly irrelevant.59 Even if one does not accept that antiintend to form an employment contract with the employer, though allowing
organizational standing for the group that sponsored the testers), with Kyles v. J.K.
Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that employment
testers had standing to sue under Title VII, reasoning that the FHA and Title VII both take
“broad aim at discrimination in their respective sectors and in that sense are the
functional equivalents of one another”). In regulatory guidance, the EEOC has taken the
position that testers can file charges and litigate claims of employment discrimination. See
Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Whether “Testers” Can File Charges and
Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination, EEOC (May 22, 1996), http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html [http://perma.cc/C8WA-NPYV].
57. The EEOC has tried to initiate matched-pair testing over the past several decades
but has abandoned the project in the face of opposition from some members of Congress.
See Michael J. Yelnosky, Employment Testers Revisited, in Labor and Employment Law
Initiatives and Proposals Under the Obama Administration: Proceedings of the New York
University 62nd Annual Conference on Labor 685, 687 (Zev J. Eigen & Samuel Estreicher
eds., 2011) (describing how in 1998 Congress conditioned a budgetary increase for the
EEOC upon the Agency’s abandonment of its request for funding for testers). The EEOC
has directed funding to private groups to conduct such testing. See id. (noting that after
Congress blocked the EEOC’s testing program, the Agency provided $200,000 to private
groups to carry out a testing program).
58. For an account of this early critique of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see
generally Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, supra note 7, at 213–17.
59. See Ford, supra note 19, at 10–14 (arguing that “civil rights litigation and activism
don’t do enough to redress today’s most serious social injustices, many of which aren’t
caused by overt prejudice or simple discrimination”); Loury, Anatomy of Racial Inequality,
supra note 6, at 92–93 (arguing that discrimination should be “demoted, dislodged from
its current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American
life”); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1120 (2009) (arguing
that if “we are legitimately concerned about substantive disparities” then the “goal of
eliminating discrimination is too modest, not ambitious enough”).
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discrimination law is irrelevant (which as I explain below, I do not60), it is
not hard to discern a mismatch between antidiscrimination law and the
complex problems of exclusion today. To some extent legal scholars have
recognized this mismatch: Modern day discrimination is often characterized as subtle, implicit, and the result of “favoritism” rather than of
simple bias.61 Yet, the problem extends further. Discrimination, even if
we incorporate notions of implicit bias, is but one phenomenon that
generates forms of racial or gender exclusion. Discrimination interacts
with other mechanisms, many of which are rooted in longstanding
patterns of economic exclusion including affordability of housing and
social services, segregation, access to training and education, and social
capital networks.62 The mismatch occurs because antidiscrimination
frameworks often assume a type of formal equality among individuals or
groups.63 In the area of employment, for instance, the antidiscrimination
model takes workers where it finds them, and thus it fails to provide
training or address other barriers to inclusion such as transportation or
childcare.
Similarly, Professor Sam Issacharoff has advanced the notion of a
mismatch between the antidiscrimination model and contemporary
problems in the domain of voting.64 There is a relation between
Professor Issacharoff’s mismatch notion and the one invoked here: a
realization that discrimination remedies are too limited to address the
full range of barriers to participation and inclusion. For my part, the end
result of a mismatch analysis is not to claim that race and ethnicity are
irrelevant today. Rather, it is to recognize the complex ways, beyond and
including discrimination, in which race and ethnicity might remain
relevant. This could include accounting for the role that place, networks,
institutional practice, and political and social capital play in shaping
opportunity.

60. See infra notes 72–82 and accompanying text (rejecting a binary approach to
antidiscrimination law and discussing the merits of antidiscrimination litigation).
61. See, e.g., Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 6, at 468–69 (describing
complex factors that generate exclusion); see also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying
text (discussing the limitations of doctrine that emphasizes explicit discrimination as well
as the realities of implicit discrimination).
62. See, e.g., Derek A. Neal & William R. Johnson, The Role of Premarket Factors in
Black-White Wage Differences, 104 J. Pol. Econ. 869, 873–74 (1996) (finding that
differences in educational achievement among fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds explains a
substantial percentage of the black–white gap in wages among young men).
63. This is manifest, for instance, in the reliance on comparators for proof of
employment discrimination, which Professor Suzanne Goldberg has described in her
work. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 43, at 764–70 (arguing that reliance on comparators
displaces thicker, more contextual understandings of discrimination).
64. Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
Harv. L. Rev. 95, 120 (2013) (urging a move beyond race-based antidiscrimination
remedies to address barriers to voter access).
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One consequence of this mismatch may be a disconnect between the
antidiscrimination law framework and what appears to motivate individuals and groups on the ground. The availability of jobs at all, as well as
pay and job conditions (for instance, payment of living wages and
availability of sick leave), may seem more important from the perspective
of advocates and workers than antidiscrimination law. With lower-wage
workers concentrated in poorly paid retail jobs, reformers today concentrate on the strategy of “raising the floor” of wages and protections on which
many workers (including women and people of color) find themselves
reliant.65
Again, I do not believe that antidiscrimination law is wholly irrelevant. Along with others, I have devoted time to thinking about how the
current litigation regime might be strengthened.66 Yet, I think there are
inherent limitations to the current antidiscrimination approach. As
indicated above, it is a framework skewed against less-resourced victims of
exclusion, and one that struggles to deal with current complexities.67
Beyond that, part of the implication of the preceding analysis is that the
current system seems a rather circuitous way of reaching regulatory goals.
In order to get entities to incorporate practices of inclusion at the front
end, it requires private initiation by relatively weak parties at the back
end, or ex post, after the alleged discrimination has occurred.
In addition to these internal critiques, the marginalization of antidiscrimination law in recent discourse to advance economic inequality
has also become a problem. Major academic pieces on economic inclusion may assume a baseline of civil rights law, but civil rights are often not
featured in contemporary strategies to achieve economic equality,
whether centered around courts or policy domains.68
65. Reformers and low-wage-worker groups currently organize around the strategy of
“raising the floor,” which refers primarily to efforts to raise the minimum wage, combat
wage theft, and address occupational hazards. See, e.g., Ctr. on Wis. Strategy, Raising the
Floor Milwaukee: Toward Better Wages and Labor Standards for Low-Wage Workers 10
(2013), http://www.cows.org/_data/documents/1491.pdf [http://perma.cc/YDH3-V5GT];
Fiscal Policy Inst., Raising the Floor: How Wage Standards Protect Workers, Build
Communities and Strengthen Our City 5 (2014), http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/Raising-the-Floor-Wage-Standards-12-16-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q2UTAKBP]. Increasingly groups are emphasizing concepts of economic mobility and including
the notion of “building ladders” along with raising the floor. See, e.g., Maureen Conway &
Steven L. Dawson, Aspen Inst., Raise the Floor and Build Ladders: Workforce Strategies
Supporting Mobility and Stability for Low-Income Workers 6, 8 (2016), http://
assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2016/04/Raise-the-Floor-and-Build-Ladders-TheAspen-Institute-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/A76G-RNCJ].
66. See Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, supra note 7, at 217–22 (describing
promising administrative law interventions on the basis of Title VII and Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act).
67. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
68. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination 24 (2017) (proposing as
a method of checking economic domination a renewed emphasis on the “tradition of
administrative law that emphasizes interest representation, participation, and contestation
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In part, this omission might reflect a tendency to sideline race when
addressing economic inequality.69 Or it may be the result of an empirical
debate that assumes discrimination is not a meaningful contributor to
economic inequality.70 But the exclusion likely also reflects a normative
political choice in which discussion of antidiscrimination law (“race”)
may subvert the purportedly broader strategies needed to address
economic inequality. This choice is manifest in contemporary discourse,
which disconnects what one might call economic inequality from antidiscrimination remedies. For example, social movements often direct their
momentum to policy reforms to help low-wage workers, such as
minimum wage increases and paid sick leave, rather than to civil rights
remedies. Indeed, as Professor Kate Andrias and others have observed,
law—at least its judicially enforced strand—is not central to social
movement organizing on economic inequality.71
C.

Beyond the Binaries

Given these critiques it is easy to then construct a binary. On one
side we have antidiscrimination law, associated with courts, divorced
from social movements, concerned with formal equality, and, perhaps
above all, a relic of the past.72 On the other side we have at least the
aspiration of something newer, more dynamic, and responsive to contemporary social and economic inequality, with normative goals that go
beyond exclusion and inequality and that resonate with social
movements.73

in the regulatory process”); Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional
Political Economy: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic
Inequality, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1287, 1289 (2016) (explaining that the conventions of contem
porary constitutional discourse have invoked civil rights only to limit policymaking, rather
than to draw from them policy goals, such as economic equality); Olatunde C.A. Johnson,
Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1647, 1649–50
(2016) [hereinafter Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion] (explaining that contemporary
strategies to achieve economic equality largely do not rely on antidiscrimination law).
69. See Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, supra note 68, at 1647–48 (asking whether
race is an “unwelcome intruder” in the “new” discourse on economic inequality).
70. See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond
Market Interactions, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1998, at 117, 121 (arguing that “market
discrimination is only one small part of” contemporary racial disparities).
71. See Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1591, 1621
(2016) (arguing that “common law courts—faithful to precedent, incremental in
approach, drawn from the elite—will adopt the constitutional arguments that progressive
constitutional law scholars urge”).
72. See supra notes 58–60 (citing the work of Richard Thompson Ford, Glenn Loury,
Susan Sturm, and others that see civil rights remedies as “first-generation” or outmoded).
73. See supra note 65 (providing examples of contemporary organizing to advance
economic inclusion); see also Andrias, supra note 71, at 1603–05 (discussing the efforts of
the Fight for 15, Domestic Workers Alliance, and other low-wage worker campaigns as
examples of contemporary organizing to advance economic inclusion).
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It is important not to overstate this binary, particularly now when
litigation to address state-sponsored discrimination has renewed importance.74 The current moment makes plain the continued salience of
litigation and it bears emphasis that civil rights ligation, as discussed
below, is much more rich and varied than the literature allows.
For one, much of the critique of the limits of lawyer-driven antidiscrimination law may be overstated. Even as to the paradigmatic LDF
strategy to dismantle formal segregation in education, critics may
inadequately capture the ways in which law interacted with groups and
social movements.75 Commentators have offered accounts of contemporary civil rights legal campaigns to address transportation, environmental, and housing inequities in which civil rights legal strategies are
deeply enmeshed with social movements and groups.76
Most recently, litigation has become resurgent in efforts to address
inequality and violations of civil rights and civil liberties, with the courts
emerging as a bulwark against potential government excesses. With some
success, advocates are litigating in courts to address voter identification
laws, changes to voter access provisions, and partisan and racially discriminatory gerrymanders, as well as equal protection and other claims
arising out of the Trump Administration’s actions tightening restrictions
on immigration, asylum, and visitation to the United States.77
Nor is it true that litigation aimed at antidiscrimination and litigation to address economic inclusion are irreconcilable. Early Title VII
cases that LDF pursued after the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
sought to open up semiskilled industries to lower-wage workers, thereby

74. See infra note 77 (providing examples of litigation).
75. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of Progressive Lawyering, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 213, 228–31 (1993) (reviewing Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering: One
Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice (1992)) (describing ways in which lawyers
engage with community-based organizations).
76. See Penda D. Hair, Rockefeller Found., Louder than Words: Lawyers,
Communities and the Struggle for Justice 85–140 (2001), http://www.racialequitytools.org/
resourcefiles/hair.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7P9-HC3T] (describing the work of civil rights
litigators who worked with community-based organizations to advance racial equity in
transportation, the environment, and other domains).
77. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (affirming the trial
court’s conclusion that race was the predominant rationale for the redrawing of two
congressional districts after the 2010 census in violation of the Voting Rights Act); County
of Santa Clara v. Trump, Nos. 17-cv-00574-WHO & 17-cv-00485-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081,
at *29 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (granting Santa Clara’s and San Francisco’s motions for a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Trump Administration’s Executive
Order threatening to terminate federal funding for jurisdictions that it deemed out of
compliance with particular immigration enforcement provisions); Plaintiff’s Original
Complaint at 2, Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-193
(NGR)) (challenging a Texas voter identification law).
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using antidiscrimination law as a lever to expand economic opportunity.78
Efforts to address public housing segregation and siting practices that
concentrate low-income housing in urban areas have relied on equal
protection and fair housing law.79 The remedies that the public housing
desegregation cases launched—including the famous Gautreaux program
in which low-income minority residents in public housing were given the
opportunity to live in low-poverty neighborhoods,80 and its progeny, the
modern choice voucher programs81—have their genesis in the civil rights
framework of desegregation but are effectively antipoverty strategies.82
But even as one avoids creating a sharp binary that casts courts and
antidiscrimination law as irrelevant to address racial, ethnic, and economic inequities, the limitations of past litigation and public law strategies would seem to demand supplemental approaches. The limits of
antidiscrimination law should lead us to examine (1) the possibilities of
strategies that extend beyond the prohibitory antidiscrimination regime
as a framework to advance inclusion, attending to substantive and
resource disparities that do not fit well within the formal equality model;
(2) a broader range of strategies that, while not sidelining courts,
incorporate other levers to prompt inclusion; and (3) models that
engage social movements and local groups, including those not organized
around antidiscrimination.
Scholarly responses to the limitations of the antidiscrimination
framework often turn to strategies that exit the framework of public law
as it operates in courts or regulation. Professor Ford argues that social
reformers and advocates should focus less on civil rights claims in courts
as a way of addressing contemporary racial inequality, and more on
policy reforms and social welfare programs that take place outside of
courts and that more directly address the skills and resource gaps that

78. See Johnson, Leveraging Antidiscrimination, supra note 7, at 217 (explaining
that antidiscrimination reformers’ strategies were cognizant of social and economic
inequality, as shown by their targeting of discrimination among blue-collar workers in the
manufacturing and construction industries ).
79. See, e.g., Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (D. Md. 2005) (finding
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to have concentrated public and
low-income housing in Baltimore City in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
80. For an account of the Gautreaux program, see generally Alexander Polikoff,
Waiting for Gautreaux: A Story of Segregation, Housing, and the Black Ghetto 219–69
(2006).
81. See Housing Choice Voucher Program, HUD, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet [http://
perma.cc/UH5U-LFHB] (last visited July 31, 2017).
82. See Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 Am. Econ. Rev.
855, 859–60 (2016) (finding positive earnings and education effects for children who,
through housing voucher programs, moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods before the
age of thirteen).
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contribute to resource inequities.83 This is in many ways the approach
that Constance Baker Motley herself adopted after working at LDF,
through which she sought to advance equality through policy reform in
state and local government.84
Professor Sturm has emphasized the importance of intervening at
the institutional level, shifting from court-ordered remedial approaches
to approaches that emphasize institutional redesign—in education, employment, and other areas—toward goals of “full and fair participation.”85
These social welfare approaches and institutional problem-solving
approaches are part of a necessary continuum of responses, but they also
should not delimit the range of responses. The importance of public law
is its ability to encourage institutions and governments to adopt the types
of statutory, judicial, and regulatory mechanisms that can promote
inclusion. One virtue of the antidiscrimination framework is its emphasis
on public law tools—which operate through coercion, penalties, incentives, and rewards—grounded in a normative concern about distributional fairness. The challenge, it seems, is to attend to the limitations of
the civil rights paradigm while harnessing some of its helpful attributes.
In the next Part, I consider the possibility of a broader set of approaches,
grounded in regulatory public law, that seek to promote inclusion across
a range of dimensions. This next Part offers an argument for broadening
the public law and regulatory architecture that we associate with equality
law.86
II. REGULATING FOR INCLUSION: INNOVATION AND PLURALISM
Examining the potential and limitations of the existing regime
invites consideration of regulatory mechanisms that might induce governments and private actors to promote inclusion.
As indicated in Part I, this exploration emphasizes regulatory tools
that (1) move beyond the prohibitory antidiscrimination approach by
prompting more front-end change by public and private institutions, (2)
use a broader range of leverage points, and (3) have the possibility of
engaging social movement actors and local groups. This Part explores
potential new models and then grapples with the potential limits or
critiques of these approaches.

83. See Ford, supra note 19, at 9–14.
84. See Motley, supra note 4, at 205.
85. Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
Higher Education, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 247, 250 (2006).
86. See id. at 250–52 (advancing a notion of an “architecture” necessary to build full
participation within institutions).

2017]
A.

EQUALITY LAW PLURALISM

1993

Exploring Paradigms

This section argues that the equality law regulatory model relies on
an insufficiently broad set of enforcement and inducement tools. Many
contexts of public regulation outside of equality law engage a fuller
range of public law and private law regulatory tools, moving from “hard”
forms of regulation—such as in command-and-control regulation and
prohibitions enforced by administrative enforcement and litigation—to
“softer” approaches—such as incentives, grants, disclosure, and even
private rating systems.87 Regulations that invoke the full continuum are
not entirely absent in the equality law regime. For instance, the EEOC
has long required employers to submit data on the race, ethnicity, and
gender of their workforce88 and recently extended this requirement to
gender pay data.89 Conditional spending programs, particularly in the
area of housing and transportation, have become sites of new regulatory
forms that move beyond the prohibitory approach to require the
development of front-end rules of inclusion self-assessment as well as
specific interventions that go beyond discrimination.90
A first possibility builds on the insights of conditioned spending,
which rewards entities and institutions that adopt inclusionary practices
87. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Understanding Privacy Policies: Content,
Self-Regulation, and Markets 6–16 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 16-18, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2736513 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing a self-regulatory approach that relies on
disclosure in consumer protection and privacy regulation). There is a broad and rich
literature on the potential benefits as well as limitations of various incentive-based
approaches on individual and firm behavior. See generally Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks:
Unlock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done (2010) (relying on behavioral
economics literature to advance ideas for personal well-being); Richard H. Thaler & Cass
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 6–8 (2008)
(making the case that attention to the architecture of choice, including the use of
seemingly less intrusive “nudges,” can advance regulatory goals); Terry F. Buss, The Effect
of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of
the Literature, 15 Econ. Dev. Q. 90 (2001) (reviewing the literature on use of tax
incentives to promote economic growth); Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives
Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the
Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 213 (2016) (exploring
literature on the potential effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation (motivational
crowding-out), but concluding that attention to the design of these incentives can
minimize crowding-out effects).
88. See EEO-1 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
employers/eeo1survey/faq.cfm [http://perma.cc/BJB9-735M] (last visited July 31, 2017)
(explaining the submission requirements for employers under EEOC regulations).
89. Questions and Answers: The Revised EEO-1 and Summary Pay Data, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/2017survey-qanda.cfm [http://perma.cc/
6N87-Y2MW] (last visited July 31, 2017).
90. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66
Duke L.J. 1771, 1800–04 (2017) [hereinafter Johnson, Overreach and Innovation]
(describing new regulatory approaches that have emerged from conditioned spending
programs).

1994

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1973

that go further than baseline requirements of antidiscrimination. One
framework is publicly funded competitive grant programs. This approach
builds on conditioned spending’s baseline of requirements to reward
entities that develop innovative strategies to meet equity goals. Competitive grants have the potential benefit of spurring new programs and can
leverage government funds in areas typically outside the reach of current
equality directives (particularly the private, nongovernmental sector).
Federal educational law has relied on this model, many would say with
mixed success,91 and other federal agencies began to rely on this grant
incentive approach in the Obama Administration.92 In addition to
leveraging government funds to develop new strategies for inclusion, the
approach has the advantage of combining agency resources to meet
multiple goals.93 For instance, in the area of employment, governments
could provide skills training for workers while also being attentive to
removing discriminatory barriers to advance inclusion of particular
groups. In the area of housing, governments could develop grant
programs that would require building affordable housing while also
advancing civil rights goals of nondiscrimination and integration. While
this grant-making approach has been used in a handful of contexts at the

91. This “race to the top” model has of course been used to mixed success in the
area of education, hampered by political conflict over the policy approach. See Valerie
Strauss, Obama’s Race to the Top Loses All Funding in 2015 Omnibus Spending Bill,
Wash. Post (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/
12/10/obamas-race-to-the-top-loses-all-funding-in-2015-omnibus-spending-bill/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
92. Three federal departments—HUD, the Department of Transportation, and the
Environmental Protection Agency—have initiated a “partnership for sustainable
communities,” which awards money to support state and local efforts to build affordable
housing, redesign transportation infrastructure, and promote environmental efficiency.
See About Us, P’ship for Sustainable Cmtys., http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/
mission/about-us [http://perma.cc/G387-X8VY] (last visited July 31, 2017) (describing
2015 goals as promoting using “agency resources to advance Ladders of Opportunity for
every American and every community . . . helping communities adapt to a changing
climate, while mitigating future disaster losses . . . [and] supporting implementation of
community-based development priorities”); see also Apprenticeship USA Investments,
DOL, http://www.dol.gov/featured/apprenticeship/grants [http://perma.cc/8YNP-UTCX]
(last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (describing up to $100 million in grants financed by a user fee
generated by the H-1B nonimmigrant visa program). The grants competition will “focus
on public-private partnerships between employers, business associations, joint labormanagement organizations, labor organizations, training providers, community colleges,
local and state governments, the workforce system, non-profits and faith-based
organizations.” Id.; see also TechHire, DOL (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/dol/
grants/funding-ops.htm [http://perma.cc/64LU-SS7Q] (last updated Jan. 17, 2017)
(announcing $100 million in grants to support innovative approaches to moving lowskilled workers onto the fastest paths to well-paying information technology and highgrowth jobs in in-demand industries such as healthcare, advanced manufacturing, and
financial services).
93. See Johnson, Overreach and Innovation, supra note 90, at 1794–98 (describing
emergent grant programs at the federal level).
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federal level, it might be used more broadly by governments at every level
to advance inclusion. For instance, states or localities could use their
resources to advance a similar approach—placing inclusionary requirements on grants for workforce development or rewarding land-use
redevelopment grants to entities that promote inclusionary housing
policies.
Beyond the competitive grant model, another approach would be to
attach a set of mandates or goals to a more expansive swath of government benefits or programs. Governments design tax programs and issue
tax incentives, make zoning decisions, issue permits and licenses, and
purchase services. Any of these might be areas for leveraging inclusion.
Many regions currently use tax incentives to spur affordable housing
development.94 The question is whether this approach could be
undertaken more widely and in ways that cut across traditional categories. For instance, localities could rezone land or provide tax incentives
to entities that engage in partnerships to train and hire traditionally
excluded workers. They could also fast-track permits or licenses for
businesses that engage in inclusive hiring practices. The general
principle is that entities interact with government in a range of settings—
and many of those settings might become leverage points for inclusion.
In the context of employment, these regulatory leverage points
might include procurement and other mechanisms such as zoning, tax
credits, licensing, and negotiated labor agreements. For instance, local
governments can enact a set of regulatory requirements and incentives
for hiring and training minority and traditionally excluded workers, and
for encouraging linkages between credentialing institutions (high schools,
trade schools, community-based organizations, and community colleges)
and employers. To address the skills, social capital, and network deficits,
the regulatory tools must do more than create hiring requirements; they
must also create linkages between those entities that help workers
develop skills and capacity and those that hire workers. The specific
regulatory tools and industries targeted would depend on the local and
regional context.
For example, contractors and labor unions working on major,
multiyear public projects could be directed to agree to a workplace
equity and inclusion component. The inclusionary agreement may require
the hiring and training of graduates from particular training schools or
community workforce programs that train and support historically excluded groups, or of a certain percentage of local workers on a craft-by-

94. See, e.g., 80/20 Housing Program, N.Y. State Homes & Cmty. Renewal, http://
www.nyshcr.org/Topics/Developers/MultifamilyDevelopment/8020HousingProgram.htm
[http://perma.cc/3JWD-MAMR] (last updated Mar. 30, 2011) (offering tax-exempt financing to multifamily rental developments in which at least twenty percent of the units
are set aside for low-income residents).
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craft basis to the extent allowable by local law. Furthermore, race,
ethnicity, and gender hiring goals could be set as allowed by law and
local conditions. Monitoring and accountability by the government actor
and by community stakeholders would be built into the agreement at its
inception.
Another more challenging example would involve a legal and
regulatory structure to require or incentivize hiring and training of
underrepresented workers in private-sector workplaces that do not have
government contracts, and in which the jobs require high levels of skills
or training. A case in point may be offered by a technology or health
services company that seeks to expand or relocate in a city neighborhood. In another scenario, a company might seek to move into an
industrial area that requires land use rezoning. Certain hiring, training,
or workforce investment requirements might be attached to this
rezoning that would help provide entry for workers of color or historically excluded groups. This could involve partnering with community or
technical colleges that engage in industry-specific training programs. It is
worth noting that these suggested approaches build on a full range of
institutional incentives that motivate inclusion. Unions might seek to
enhance their membership and power (recognizing changing demographics) and to limit the expansion of non-union labor. Unions are also
often repeat players with cities or regions so they are likely to have
incentives to meaningfully implement inclusionary goals that are placed
in bargaining agreements.95 Cities or regions might adopt these plans to
achieve more meaningful community revitalization; leverage bond, state,
or federal money to train and develop the local workforce; and mollify
community groups. In turn, companies might want to relocate or expand
services in a particular neighborhood or in an emerging downtown, they
might see training workers as important to their future growth, or they
may want to advance a corporate image that is consistent with diversity
and inclusion.96
There are a range of challenges that influence the choice of
regulatory inducements, and some inducement structures might require
legal changes. For instance, local procurement laws often require
awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, and some localities do not have
95. See generally Ester R. Fuchs, Dorian Warren & Kimberly Bayer, Expanding
Opportunity for Middle Class Jobs in New York City: Minority Youth Employment in the
Building and Construction Trades (2014), http://www.constructionskills.org/ColumbiaSIPA0314.pdf [http://perma.cc/7X4B-7FA5] (describing a union–city partnership to train workers in
apprenticeship programs).
96. I developed some of these ideas in the area of employment in prior work. See
generally Olatunde Johnson, Promoting Racial and Ethnic Inclusion in Employment
Through Regulatory Mandates and Incentives, Roosevelt Inst. (2015), http://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Promoting-Racial-and-Ethnic-Inclusion-1.
pdf [http://perma.cc/8JXH-GXA5] (exploring a broad range of regulatory solutions for
addressing occupational segregation among low-wage workers).
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power to change the laws governing procurement or zoning at the local
level.97 Tax incentives raise an additional set of challenges as they must
be calibrated to avoid giving away more than they return to communities
in terms of tax revenue and economic development gains, and because
any hiring mandates or requirements attached to these incentives may
have the opposite effect of discouraging businesses. These concerns are
not fatal to the general framework, but they do mean that the precise
structure will differ among regions.
B.

Addressing Limits

A regime that relies so heavily on these types of regulatory inducements might be faulted for giving up on direct mandates, sticks, and
prohibitions that seem to form the current civil rights regime. To the
extent that many of the suggested interventions operate at the state and
local levels, such a regime provides benefits of experimentation but at
the expense of baseline requirements of citizenship or inclusion that
apply nationally. One might argue that it renders our goals of equity and
inclusion subject to the vagaries of institutional incentives and regional
variation.
As a general concern, this is likely overdetermined. Current civil
rights regimes also depend on incentives and inducements that take
place in the shadow of the regulatory framework, as suggested earlier in
Part I. Further, the motivations behind thinking about a new set of
regulatory designs for inclusion are the inadequacies of the existing
mechanisms, particularly in dealing with complex problems at the
intersection of group-based and economic exclusion. To the extent that
these mechanisms might rely on government incentives and inducement,
one might substitute the term regulatory “catalysts” or “levers.” What I
mean to capture in this framework is the need to develop public law
regimes that build on the complex motivations that individuals, institutions, and governments have to work toward inclusion, which are not
easily or properly captured by an assessment of economic costs and
benefits.98 In simpler terms, governments, nonprofits, and private actors
might seek to advance inclusion to benefit their economic bottom line
and avoid sanctions, as well as to include historically excluded communities, revitalize low-income communities, promote economic development, provide better education and housing, and express public values.

97. See Ruthann Robinson, Dressing Constitutionally: Hierarchy, Sexuality and
Democracy from Our Hairstyles to Our Shoes 179 (2013) (describing how local antisweatshop procurement rules deviated from local laws that typically required procurement
from the lowest bidder).
98. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 64, at 120 (noting that “[p]ublic law enforcement does
not yield an easy cost-benefit calculus of the sort that has driven the economic analyses of
private law enforcement”).
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Regions might have different appetites for adopting inclusionary
incentives. But it is worth noting that a region that adopts a pervasive set
of regulatory mechanisms for inclusion might entrench a norm that runs
deeper than current antidiscrimination frameworks: that tax, zoning, and
procurement—all government benefits—are also potential areas to advance inclusion. In addition, local or regional programs have potential to
“diffuse” nationally, through networks and competition.99
A related concern is that any potential mechanisms outside of the
prohibitory mandates of antidiscrimination law might be insufficiently
coercive or too “soft.” To some extent, this will depend on design.
Mechanisms need not operate solely on the “goals and timetables”
framework that is of mixed efficacy in the area of affirmative action, but
can also depend on quite specific requirements. Race- or gender-based
quotas are a nonstarter in the American context—generating judicial
and political skepticism for reasons that one might not find fully
persuasive.100 But specific goals can be set that are not delineated on the
basis of identity. Current rules that govern developing affordable housing
and local hiring requirements often rely on the attainment of specific
numerical goals.101
Still, the design of both the mandate and incentive mechanisms will
have implications for the ability to achieve goals of inclusion. Such
regulatory mechanisms should be designed to reach the most disadvantaged or consistently excluded populations. There is also the risk of
underspecifying or having conflicting goals. This is a problem, for
instance, that has plagued the low-income housing tax credit program—
the largest source of affordable rental housing—which by regulation
prioritizes developing housing in racially segregated areas in ways that
can be in tension with requirements that federally funded housing
programs promote integration.102
These challenges, however, are not fatal to the core project of
expanding the range of regulatory mechanisms that may induce inclusion. They are ultimately questions of how a specific inducement or
regulatory leverage point is designed and of the accountability structure
in place.
99. Johnson, Local Turn, supra note 30, at 135.
100. See Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences: A Transnational Re-Evaluation, in
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law 228, 229–30 (Deborah Hellman &
Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) (detailing jurisprudential history of American law’s prohibition
of racial quotas).
101. See, e.g., infra note 112 and accompanying text (describing first-source hiring
programs).
102. See Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Civil Rights Mandates in the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program (2004), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/
crmandates.pdf [http://perma.cc/DR6S-CY32] (describing a tax credit statute’s conflicting
requirements on siting of low-income housing).
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III. LOCATIONS OF INNOVATION
Part II considered a range of mechanisms to broaden regulatory
inducements to promote identity and socioeconomic inclusion by public
and private actors. That Part sought to explore these models in a general
sense and to theorize the political economy that might make them more
or less effective or likely to be adopted by particular jurisdictions. This
Part now presents contemporary examples of regulation to promote
inclusion that deploy local levers of procurement, tax, and zoning. Many
of these are spurred by cities seeking to leverage the return of business
and employers, while avoiding or diminishing the effects of housing
displacement and inequality. The examples below reveal the potential
benefits of exploring new regulatory frameworks that broaden the levers
of inducement, emphasize front-end requirements, address economic as
well as identity inclusion, and engage local stakeholders. As noted below,
any specific example also has its limitations, particularly on questions of
accountability and the expansiveness of its goals.
A.

Examples: Levers, Requirements, and Accountability

Localities have begun using a range of regulatory levers to address
spatial and occupational segregation and exclusion in growing urban
areas. Cities employ a variety of strategies to encourage employers to
train and hire employees in local communities and from traditionally
excluded groups, improve labor market and wage conditions, prevent
displacement, and provide affordable housing.103 The use of these regulatory levers has expanded in recent years.104
Specifically, jurisdictions are using city contracts, tax incentives, and
land-zoning approvals as leverage points to require inclusive development by companies. Most typical is the use of procurement—which cities
have long harnessed to place hiring, wage, and other conditions on
recipients of city contracts—to promote economic inclusion.105 The City
of Oakland’s labor agreement for the redevelopment of its port provides
an example, expanding uses of procurement from affirmative action and
wage conditions to mandate the development of training, hiring, and

103. For a discussion of Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs), first-source hiring,
and procurement conditions, see infra notes 104–120.
104. See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Toolkit, P’ship for Working Families,
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreements-andpolicies [http://perma.cc/PHT2-UFNA] (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (discussing CBAs and
providing examples of cities’ involvement in equitable development and community
empowerment).
105. See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Note, Constructing Meaningful Access to Work: Lessons
from the Port of Oakland Project Labor Agreement, 35 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 375,
390–403 (2004) (providing a case study of the City of Oakland’s labor agreement that
sought to address hiring of local residents, training, support, and wage conditions).
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support initiatives for local residents, such as childcare programs.106
Jurisdictions also leverage public funding and the use of public lands.
For instance, the City of Oakland in 2013, after prolonged advocacy by
organized community groups, instituted a redevelopment plan for public
waterfront property that created a training and referral pathway to
employment for local, predominantly minority residents in the city.107
The redevelopment plan also required employers participating in the
redevelopment to remove barriers to the employment of certain categories of previously incarcerated job seekers.108
State and local contracts, public land, and public spending provide
straightforward examples of public goods that may be seamlessly marshaled as regulatory levers to advance equality and inclusionary goals. A
recent innovation has involved the broadening of the leverage points to
include land-use rezonings, zoning approvals, and tax benefits, implicitly
framing these economic inducements as public goods to which inclusionary conditions might be attached.109
As a matter of regulatory design, some jurisdictions have introduced
these inclusionary inducements as a set of across-the-board requirements
on entities that receive public goods, including tax credits. For instance,
the City of San Francisco has for several years required entities that
receive city funds or city leases, or whose projects require planning
approval, to engage in “first source” hiring of local residents from
particular training centers with the goal of connecting economically

106. See id.
107. See P’ship for Working Families, Paving the Path to Opportunity: How Revive
Oakland Innovated a New Model for Inclusive Economic Development, P’ship for
Working Families, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/pwf/files/publications/Revive%
20Oakland%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/TV4V-QC9T] (last visited July 31, 2017)
(describing “[t]wo major points of leverage,” the need for public funding and the use of
public land, that supported the community’s demands).
108. Id.
109. For examples of use of land rezoning, see Community Benefit Agreement 2015–
2018 Memorandum of Understanding Between City and County of San Francisco City
Administrator and Twitter, Inc. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://sfgsa.org/sites/default/files/
FileCenter/Documents/12590-TwitterCBA.pdf [http://perma.cc/FVC7-F3RZ]; Cent. Mkt.
Citizen’s Advisory Comm., Framework for Community Benefit Agreements, SFGov.org
(June 21, 2012), http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/
10356-2012%20-%20CAC%20Central%20Market%20-%20CBA%20Framework%206-21-12.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BVU8-EPP6]; Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and
Policies in Effect, P’ship for Working Families, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/
policy-tools-community-benefits-agreements-and-policies-effect [http://perma.cc/B66E-D9F5]
(last visited July 31, 2017); see also Community Benefit Agreements, Citizen’s Advisory
Comm. for Cent. Mkt. & Tenderloin Area (2013), http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/
community-benefit-agreements-2013 [http://perma.cc/2Z9C-DQU7] (last visited July
31, 2017) (listing CBAs signed in 2013 between the City of San Francisco and six
technology companies when the Tenderloin community was rezoned, which provided tax
benefits to employers).
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disadvantaged local residents to employment in growing sectors.110 The
City of Detroit recently enacted an ordinance that requires developers
with projects valued at more than $75 million, and who are receiving
more than $1 million in tax benefits from the city, to negotiate a
community benefits agreement.111
The range of requirements placed on businesses and employers
extends to a broader set of categories and supports than the firstgeneration procurement contracts that required the hiring of minorities
or women. As to employment, the requirements are generally more
targeted to local communities or specific groups of disadvantaged job
seekers. For instance, they may be hyperlocal, requiring the hiring of
residents from local communities or of employees who are trained and
linked to employers by local community-based organizations.112 These
requirements also address barriers that are typically outside the scope of
antidiscrimination law’s formal equality model, by providing supports
that address the full range of barriers that workers face such as exclusion
from race- and gender-delineated networks,113 lack of adequate training,
and lack of access to childcare services. This is achieved by connecting
employers to specific training centers, providing employer-based training,
and linking with community-based organizations to provide childcare
and other support.
These regulatory interventions also encompass more than employment, often extending to areas such as green space, education, and hous110. See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 83.3 (2017); City & Cty. of S.F., First Source Hiring
Program, SFGov.org, http://mission.sfgov.org/oca_bid_attachments/fa22336.pdf [http://
perma.cc/EUU2-LZ3V] (last visited July 31, 2017) (requiring employers who meet the
code definition to make a good-faith effort to hire from designated community-based
organizations that train local workers).
111. Erick Trickey, The Test Just Began for the Community Benefits Movement, Next
City (Feb. 20, 2017), http://nextcity.org/features/view/detroit-test-began-communitybenefit-agreements-movement [http://perma.cc/6AAP-XG2Y].
112. See, e.g., City & Cty. of S.F., supra note 110 (delineating the requirements of San
Francisco’s First Source Hiring Program).
113. For an account of race-based hiring and referral networks in blue-collar sectors,
see Kris Paap, How Good Men of the Union Justify Inequality: Dilemmas of Race and
Labor in the Building Trades, 33 Lab. Stud. J. 371, 376 (2008) (reviewing literature
showing that unionized construction workplaces display practices and preferences that
reproduce race and gender privilege beyond the scope of the law). Earlier studies of the
construction trades found that despite the considerable enforcement attention directed at
them, informal hiring and training practices and the political power of unions limited the
access of black and Latino workers to jobs. See Deidre A. Royster, Race and the Invisible
Hand: How White Networks Exclude Black Men from Blue-Collar Jobs 176–77 (2003);
Mercer L. Sullivan, “Getting Paid”: Youth Crime and Work in the Inner City 60, 231
(1989) (providing an ethnography of young black, Latino, and white males and finding
that, through kin and social networks, white males were able to monopolize the few
higher-paying jobs in the studied urban area); Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The
Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Discrimination in
Construction, 19 Pol. & Soc’y 291, 293 (1991).
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ing. When San Francisco rezoned the Tenderloin District to make room
for technology companies who sought to move into the city, area
residents raised concerns about the lack of affordable housing and
potential displacement of residents through increased housing prices.114
One feature of the benefits agreements ultimately negotiated with
community groups was the inclusion of measures to mitigate housing
displacement.115
Effective inducement strategies build in accountability and monitoring as general practices and provide judicial review and penalties for
noncompliance.116 As many fall short of that goal,117 accountability and
enforcement will remain the biggest challenges. The agreements that
result from these regulatory interventions do not always set clear goals,
allowing employers to simply engage in “good faith” efforts to achieve
them.118
This raises more fundamental questions about the use of regulatory
inducements that depend on luring businesses and employers to
underserved areas and communities. Localities may have untapped regulatory power to tax and set conditions on contracts and land use. But
cities are also engaged in an inevitable dance in which they do not want
114. Oscar Perry Abello, S.F. Tax Break Tapped by Twitter Intended to Help
Struggling Neighborhoods, Next City (May 31, 2017), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/
san-francisco-tax-breaks-twitter-community-benefits-agreement [http://perma.cc/R4BHUXCX].
115. See, e.g., Community Benefit Agreement 2017 Memorandum of Understanding
Between City and County of San Francisco City Administrator and Fitness SF
Mid Market, Inc. (2017), http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/sites/default/files/
Documents/FitnessSFMidMarketCBA2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/EH5V-776G] [hereinafter
Fitness SF Mid Market CBA]; Community Benefit Agreement 2017 Memorandum of
Understanding Between City and County of San Francisco City Administrator and Market
on Market, LLC. (2017), http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/sites/default/files/Documents/
MarketonMarketLLC_CBA2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/HGC6-BUXZ]; Community Benefit
Agreement 2017 Memorandum of Understanding Between City and County of San
Francisco City Administrator and Spotify USA, Inc. (2017), http://sfgov.org/
centralmarketcac/sites/default/files/Documents/SpotifyUSAIncCBA2017.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5MW3-SABT]; Community Benefit Agreement 2017 Memorandum of
Understanding Between City and County of San Francisco City Administrator and
Zoosk, Inc. (2016), http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/sites/default/files/Documents/
ZooskIncCBA2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/QWB8-94XP].
116. See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 105, at 401 (detailing accountability and enforcement requirements for an Oakland port redevelopment project).
117. See, e.g., Fitness SF Mid Market CBA, supra note 115 (failing to provide for
judicial review or penalties for noncompliance).
118. This was a critique of early versions of community benefit agreements signed by
Twitter in San Francisco. See Yoona Ha, Twitter, Other Tech Companies Get S.F. Tax
Breaks but Show Little Progress Hiring in Neighborhood, S.F. Pub. Press (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2013-11/twitter-other-tech-companies-get-sf-tax-breaks-butshow-little-progress-hiring-in-neighborhood [http://perma.cc/E5PQ-PZES] (finding that
the agreements were “vaguely worded” and that the companies have been “slow to report
their progress” to the city).
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to set conditions that pose the risk of driving out businesses and thus
diminishing their potential employment and tax base.
B.

Community Benefits as Equality Law

In the end, the point is less to put forward any specific initiative as a
perfect model than to encourage fresh discussion of new avenues for
public law innovations that advance equality. The community benefit
agreements discussed above have generated interest from scholars of
labor and community economic development,119 and there is evidence
that they are benefiting local communities.120 Labor scholars have cast
these initiatives as part of a “new accountable development” movement
in which employers and residents seek full participation in the
development that is shaping their communities.121 But these types of
agreements are not included within the framework of equality law, which
is generally confined to antidiscrimination law. My suggestion is that we
also understand these regulatory inducements as an equality law
intervention—part of a continuum of regulation that begins with traditional antidiscrimination law but that should ultimately include a broader
range of mechanisms as well as a broader range of equality and
inclusionary goals.
CONCLUSION
This may be an inopportune time to look forward. Many bedrock
principles of equal protection and civil rights gains seem threatened in

119. See, e.g., Virginia Parks et al., The Mobility Agenda, Community Benefits
Agreements: Policy for the Twenty-First Century Economy 4 (2008), http://
www.mobilityagenda.org/home/file.axd?file=2008%2F12%2FCBApaperfortheinternet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7KUJ-8XBR]; Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and
Practice of Economic Justice: Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New
Accountable Development Movement, 17 J. Community Prac. 88, 89 (2009); Patricia E.
Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community
Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing Agreements, 17 J.
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 113, 113–14 (2008).
120. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit
Communities?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.bostonfed.org/
publications/communities-and-banking/2017/spring/do-community-benefits-agreementsbenefit-communities.aspx [http://perma.cc/HBJ4-H7H4] (describing the benefits of the
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areas such as political participation,122 employment, and housing.123 In
such a climate, one can be excused for adopting a defensive crouch, for
concentrating efforts on preserving the foundations of what Motley and
the lawyers at LDF built. And yet, this Symposium also invites us to think
more imaginatively about possibilities. The risk of spending too much
time defending, and not enough constructing, is that civil rights goals
and strategies will be seen as outmoded, insufficient, and disconnected
from contemporary social movements. The intervention offered here is
in the spirit of spurring new thinking about equality law’s next chapters.

122. See Vanita Gupta, Opinion, The Voter Purges Are Coming, N.Y. Times
(July 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/opinion/donald-trump-votingrights-purge.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (raising concern that
President Trump’s election integrity commission represents an effort to purge and repress
minority voters).
123. See Mark Lungariello, Astorino: ‘Vindication’ for Westchester in Affordable
Housing Deal, lohud (July 18, 2017), http://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/
westchester/2017/07/18/westchester-gets-closer-finishing-affordable-housing-deal/486229001/
[http://perma.cc/DT8P-HAHD] (last updated July 21, 2017) (detailing HUD’s settlement
of a housing civil rights case against a county over the objections of plaintiffs and
affordable-housing advocates).

